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Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication: Why
Universities Should Reject the Dear Colleague
Letter
Tamara Rice Lave*
INTRODUCTION
In 2011, the Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights (OCR)
responded to what many viewed as a crisis situation. A 2007 study had
found that one in five women were victims of completed or attempted
sexual assault while in college.' Making matters worse, universities
seemed either unable or unwilling to do anything about it. The problem
was not just an inability to prevent sexual assault, but the way universi-
ties responded once it happened. Women complained that their allega-
tions were not taken seriously, and even if someone was found responsi-
ble, the punishment was inadequate. One high-profile case involved two
students at the University of Colorado who sued after they reported being
repeatedly raped by football recruits. The case was settled out of court
for $2.85 million.2
* Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law. B.A., Haverford College; J.D., Stanford
Law School; Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley. I am especially grateful to Michael Froom-
kin for his admirable patience in helping me work through the administrative law portion of this
piece. I am also indebted to Gabriel (Jack) Chin, Donna Coker, Charlton Copeland, Osamudia
James, Olatunde Johnson, Steve Schnably, Scott Sundby, and Bob Weisberg for their insightful
comments and criticisms. I would also like to thank the participants at the 2016 University of Kan-
sas Law Review Symposium and the 2015 New Voices in Legal Theory Roundtable for their helpful
feedback. Finally, I would like to thank the editors at the University of Kansas Law Review (espe-
cially Abby Hall) for their careful editing.
1. See CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS ET AL., THE CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT (CSA) STUDY: FINAL
REPORT xiii (Oct. 2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/221153.pdf. Subsequent studies
have found both higher and significantly lower levels of rape and sexual assault. See DAVID CAN-
TOR, ET AL., REPORT ON THE AAU CAMPUS CLIMATE SURVEY ON SEXUAL ASSAULT AND MISCON-
DUCT, xiv (Sept. 21, 2015) (finding 33.1% of college senior women reported being the victim of
nonconsensual sexual touching at least once). But see SOFI SINOZICH & LYNN LANGTON, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT
VICTIMIZATION AMONG COLLEGE AGE FEMALES, 1995-2013 4 (Jill Thomas & Lynne McConnell,
eds., 2014) (finding the rate of rape and sexual assault for female college students was 6.1 per 1000).
2. Allison Sherry, CU Settles Case Stemmingfrom Recruit Scandal, DENVER POST (Dec. 6,
2007, 1:00 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/ci 7645722.
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In 2011, OCR issued its Dear Colleague Letter (DCL), in which it
called the statistics on sexual violence "deeply troubling and a call to ac-
tion for the nation."3  OCR reminded universities that sexual violence
constitutes a form of discrimination under Title IX.4 It told universities
that in order to be in compliance, they had to change disciplinary pro-
ceedings to more effectively hold rapists accountable.5 In no uncertain
terms, OCR told universities that they had to reduce the standard of proof
in disciplinary proceedings to a preponderance of the evidence, and it
strongly discouraged them from allowing the parties to directly question
one another.6 It also told universities that they should not allow the re-
spondent to review the complainant's statement unless she was able to
review his. OCR threatened to withhold federal funding to universities
that did not adequately respond,8 and it later published a list that contin-
ues to grow of those under investigation. 9 OCR has found that a number
of schools were in violation of Title IX, including Princeton University'0
and Harvard Law School." These schools have since reached settle-
ments with OCR, in which they agreed to change the way they handle
sexual assault so as to meet the protocol set forth in the DCL.'
2
Some applaud OCR's efforts,' 3 but others contend that universities
have gone too far in sacrificing the rights of the accused.' 4 Members of
3. Letter from Russlyn Ali, Assistant Sec'y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Office for
Civil Rights, to Title IX Coordinators 2 (Apr. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter],
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf.
4. Id. at 1.
5. Id. at 1-3,7-14.
6. Id. at 11-12.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 26.
9. See infra notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
10. Press Office, Princeton University Found in Violation of Title IX Reaches Agreement with
U.S. Education Department to Address, Prevent Sexual Assault and Harassment of Students, U.S.
DEP'T OF EDUc. (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/princeton-university-found-
violation-title-ix-reaches-agreement-us-education-department-address-prevent-sexua-assaut-and-
harassment-students [hereinafter Princeton Violation].
11. Press Office, Harvard Law School Found in Violation of Title Ix, Agrees to Remedy Sexual
Harassment, Including Sexual Assault of Students, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. (Dec. 30, 2014),
http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/harvard-law-school-found-violation-title-ix-agrees-remedy-
sexual-harassment-including-sexual-assault-students [hereinafter Harvard Violation].
12. See Princeton Violation, supra note 10; Harvard Violation, supra note 11.
13. See Lavinia M. Weizel, Note, The Process that is Due: Preponderance of the Evidence as
the Standard of Proof for UniversityAdjudications of Student-on-Student Sexual Assault Complaints,
53 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1642-55 (2012); Amy Chmielewski, Note, Defending The Preponderance of
The Evidence Standard in College Adjudications of Sexual Assault, 2013 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 143,
149-74 (2013).
14. See William A. Jacobsen, Accused on Campus: Charges Dropped, But the Infimy Remains,
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the law faculty at both Harvard 5 and the University of Pennsylvania 16
have publicly called for greater procedural rights for the accused, and a
Senior Fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institute has decried
OCR's Dear Colleague Letter for "institutionalizing a presumption of
guilt in sexual assault cases."' 17 The popular press has also started to call
attention to the experiences of men who say their universities never gave
them a meaningful chance to defend themselves before finding them re-
sponsible for rape and expelling them.'8
More importantly, Congress and the courts are starting to take notice
of the impact the DCL has had on college campuses. On January 7,
2016, in a move that may signal the demise of the DCL in a Republican
controlled Congress, Senator James Lankford, Chairman of the Sub-
committee on Regulatory Affairs and Federal Management, U.S. Senate
Committee on Government Affairs and Homeland Security, wrote a let-
ter to the Acting Secretary for the Department of Education demanding
that DOE provide statutory authority for the DCL. 9 Although Catherine
LEGAL INSURRECTION (May 16, 2015, 8:30 PM), http://legalinsurrection.com/2015/05/accused-on-
campus-charges-dropped-but-the-infamy-remains/; see also Naomi Shatz, Feminists, We Are Not
Winning the War on Campus Sexual Assault, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 29, 2014, 6:44 PM),
http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/naomi-shatz/feminists-we-are-not-winn b 6071500.html; Stephen
Henrick, A Hostile Environment Jbr Student DeJendants: Title IX and Sexual Assault on College
Campuses, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 49 (2013); Barclay Sutton Hendrix, Note, A Feather on One Side, A
Brick on the Other: Tilting the Scale Against Males Accused of Sexual Assault in Campus Discipli-
nary Proceedings, 47 GA. L. REV. 591, 599 (2013); Ryan D. Ellis, Mandating Injustice: The Pre-
ponderance of the Evidence Mandate Creates a New Threat to Due Process on Campus, 32 REV.
LITIG. 65, 80-81 (2013).
15. Elizabeth Bartholet et al., Rethink Harvard's Sexual Harassment Policy, BOSTON GLOBE
(Oct. 15, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/10/14/rethink-harvard-sexual-
harassment-policy/HFDDiZN7nU2UwuUuWMnqbM/story.html.
16. David Rudovsky et al., Open Letter from Members of the Penn Law School Faculty, Sexual
Assault Complaints: Protecting Complainants and the Accused Students at Universities,
PHILLY.COM (Feb. 18, 2015), http://media.philly.com/documents/OpenLetter.pdf
17. Peter Berkowitz, College Rape Accusations and the Presumption of Male Guilt, WALL ST.
J. (Aug. 20, 2011),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903596904576516232905230642.
18. Tovia Smith, Some Accused of Sexual Assault on Campus Say System Works Against Them,
NPR (Sept. 3, 2014, 1:12 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/09/03/345312997/some-accused-of-
campus-assault-say-the-system-works-against-them; Emily Yoffe, The College Rape Overcorrec-
tion, SLATE (Dec. 7, 2014, 11:53 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/double x/doublex!2014/12/college rape campus sexual assault is a
seriousjiroblem but the efforts.html; Teresa Watanabe, More College Men Are Fighting Back
Against Sexual Misconduct Cases, L.A. TIMES (June 7, 2014, 6:15 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-sexual-assault-legal-20140608-story.html.
19. Letter from Senator James Lankford, Chairman, Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs and
Fed. Mgmt., U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Gov't Affairs, U.S. Senate, to The
Hon. John B. King, Jr., Acting Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Educ. (Jan. 7, 2016)
http://www.scribd.com/doe/294821262/Sen-Lankford-letter-to-Education-Department.
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20E. Lhamon, the Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, wrote a response,
Lankford was not satisfied:
I again call on you to personally clarify that these policies are not required
by Title IX, but reflect only one of various ways schools may choose to
develop and implement policies for the prevention and remedy of sexual
harassment and sexual violence that best meet the needs of their students
and are compliant with federal law. I further ask that you immediately
rem in the regulatory abuses within the Department of Education and take
measures to ensure that all existing and future guidance documents issued
by your agency are clearly and firmly rooted in statutory authority.
2 1
Even if Congress does not pass legislation that specifically strikes
down the DCL, courts across the country have been finding that current
protections violate procedural due process 2  For example, in July 2015 a
judge ordered the University of California, San Diego to reverse the sus-
pension of a male student because the disciplinary proceedings violated
his due process rights, 23 and nine months later, a different judge over-
turned the suspension of a University of Southern California student on
the ground that he was denied a fair hearing and the substantive evidence
did not support the Appeal Panel's findings 4  On March 31, 2016, the
Massachusetts District Court ruled in favor of a Brandeis University stu-
dent who had been found responsible for "serious sexual transgres-
sions. 25 The court wrote, "Brandeis appears to have substantially im-
paired, if not eliminated, an accused student's right to a fair and impartial
process. ' ,26 The court was particularly troubled by the deprivation of the
20. Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec'y of Civil Rights, to The Hon. James
Lankford, Chairman, Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs and Fed. Mgmt., Committee on Home-
land Security and Gov't Affairs, U.S. Senate, (Feb. 17, 2016)
http://chronicle.com/items/biz/pdf/DEPT. / 20of/ 20EDUCATION / 20RESPONSE /20TO 20LA
NKFORD%20LETTER0/0202-17-16.pdf.
21. Letter from Senator James Lankford, Chairman, Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs and
Fed. Mgmt., U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Gov't Affairs, U.S. Senate, to The
Hon. John B. King, Jr., Acting Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Educ. (Mar. 4, 2016)
http://www.lankford.senate.gov/imo/media/dc/3.4.160/%20Lankford/%201etter/%20to 0/%20Dept.0/020of
%20Education.pdf.
22. See Jake New, Court Wins Jbr Accused, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 5, 2015),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/11/05/more-students-punished-over-sexual-assault-are-
winning-lawsuits-against-colleges.
23. Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. San Diego, No. 37-2015-00010549-CU-WM-CTL,
2015 WL 4394597, at *4 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 10, 2015).
24. Doe v. Univ. of S. Cal., 200 Cal. Rptr. 3d 851, 877 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
25. Doe v. Brandeis Univ., No. 15-11557-FDS, 2016 WL 1274533, at *4 (D. Mass. Mar. 31,
2016).
26. Id. at *6.
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right to cross-examine 27 as well as the lack of notice about the underlying
28
allegations .
This Article contends that although well intentioned, the mandates of
the DCL are not the best way to handle campus sexual assault. Universi-
ties should have a number of different options available, from restorative
justice processes to a full-blown adjudicatory hearing. When suspension
or expulsion may result, the respondent should have the right to an adju-
dicatory hearing with robust procedural rights. More controversially,
this Article argues that despite the DCL, universities are legally entitled
to make these changes.
This Article begins by situating university disciplinary proceedings
legally and historically. It then turns to the DCL. It discusses whether
OCR violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by not going
through notice and comment. After determining that the DCL is proce-
durally invalid, the Article discusses how universities can and should
handle these cases while still remaining in compliance with Title IX.
The Article concludes by acknowledging that even if schools would be
allowed to make these changes they are unlikely to do so because of the
considerable social (and indirect economic costs) in challenging the De-
partment of Education.
I. BACKGROUND
1964 marked a watershed moment for equality in the United States.
On July 2 of that year, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the 1964
Civil Rights Act into law.29 Although much of the Act was aimed at pre-
venting discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national
origin,30 Title VII-which banned workplace discrimination- specifi-
27. Id. at *34-35 ("While protection of victims of sexual assault from unnecessary harassment
is a laudable goal, the elimination of such a basic protection for the rights of the accused raises pro-
found concerns.... Here, there were essentially no third-party witnesses to any of the events in
question, and there does not appear to have been any contemporary corroborating evidence. The
entire investigation thus turned on the credibility of the accuser and the accused. Under the circum-
stances, the lack of an opportunity for cross-examination may have had a very substantial effect on
the faimess of the proceeding.").
28. Id. at *34.
29. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
21(2012)).
30. Id. (Title II (Injunctive Relief Against Discrimination in Places of Public Accommodation);
Title III (Desegregation of Public Facilities); Title IV (Desegregation of Public Education); Title VI
(Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs)).
2016]
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cally included sex as a protected class.3' Eight years later, Congress ex-
tended the protection against sex discrimination to the classroom with
Title IX.32 Enacted as part of the Educational Amendments of 1972, Ti-
tle IX barred sex discrimination in any education program or activity re-
ceiving federal financial assistance.33  Although there were exceptions,
such as for fraternities, any institution that violated Title IX could lose
federal funding.34
At first, Title IX was interpreted narrowly.35 In Grove City College
v. Bell, the Supreme Court held that Title IX did not apply to an entire
institution but just to the particular program receiving federal assis-
tance.36 Thus in Grove, the Court found that the receipt of federal tuition
grants by students did not trigger Title IX coverage across the entire in-
37
stitution-but just of the school's financial aid program. Congress re-
sponded by enacting the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 to clarify
the "broad application of title X.,, 38 It explicitly extended Title IX "to
all of the operation[s] of ... a college, university, or other postsecondary
institution, or a public system of higher education.., any part of which
is extended Federal financial assistance. 39
It took a while for courts to agree that Title IX extended to peer sex-
ual harassment. In 1996, the Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment
in favor of the school district on the ground that Title IX did not impose
liability for peer sexual harassment because it only covered acts perpe-
trated by recipients of federal grants.40  One year later, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit held that Title IX only applied to sexual harassment perpetrated by
employees and not by students.4' In Davis v. Monroe County Board of
31. Id. § 703(a)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012)).
32. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, §§ 901-03, 86 Stat. 235, 373-75
(1972) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012)).
33. Id.
34. Id. §§ 901(a)(5),902.
35. See Trudy Saunders Bredthauer, Twenty-Five Years Under Title IX: Have We Made Pro-
gress?, 31 CREIGHTONL. REv. 1107, 1108-09(1998); Jollee Faber, Expanding Title IX of the Edu-
cation Amendments of 1972 to Prohibit Student to Student Sexual Harassment, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S
L.J. 85, 113 n.119 (1992).
36. Grove City Coil. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1984).
37. Id.
38. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28, § 2(1) (1998).
39. Id. § 908(2)(A). Note that the law actually reached more broadly, to extend for instance to
"a department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or of a local gov-
ernment." Id. § 908(1)(A).
40. Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1008 (5th Cir. 1996).
41. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1406 (11th Cir. 1997), rev'd, 526 U.S.
629 (1999).
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Education, the Supreme Court answered the question definitively, hold-
ing that Title IX did apply to peer-on-peer sexual harassment. 4 2 In an
opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court wrote: "Having previ-
ously held that such harassment is 'discrimination' in the school context
under Title IX, this court is constrained to conclude that student-on-
student sexual harassment, if sufficiently severe, can likewise rise to the
level of discrimination actionable under the statute.
43
The Court determined further that a school could be held liable for
monetary damages in a private lawsuit if one student sexually harasses
another in the school's program.44 To prevail, the complainant had to
meet the conditions of notice and indifference set forth in Gebser v. Lago
Vista Independent School District.45 Gebser had relied on OCR's 1997
"Policy Guidance" in arguing that the school district should be liable
when "a teacher is 'aided in carrying out the sexual harassment of stu-
dents by his or her position of authority with the institution,' irrespective
of whether school district officials had any knowledge of the harassment
and irrespective of their response upon becoming aware.
46
The Court found that OCR's standard was not sufficiently demand-
ing. "[W]e will not hold a school district liable in damages under Title IX
for a teacher's sexual harassment of a student absent actual notice and
deliberate indifference.'47 Instead, the Court held that the plaintiff had to
prove that "an official who at a minimum has authority to address the al-
leged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the recipi-
ent's behalf has actual knowledge of discrimination in the recipient's
programs" and "refuses to take action to bring the recipient into compli-
ance.
48
These rulings were significant because they extended the federal
government's power to police colleges and universities. As long as a
school received federal funding, the institution was required to comply
42. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999).
43. Id. at 650.
44. Davis, 526 U.S. at 641-42, 651. The Court had previously held in Franklin v. Gwinnet
County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992), that students had a private right to damages when their
Title IX rights were violated.
45. Davis, 526 U.S. at 629, 641-42, 651 (citing Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524
U.S. 274 (1998)).
46. Id. at 282 (quoting Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, Sexual Harassment
Policy Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62
Fed. Reg. 12034, 12039 (1997)).
47. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 292-93.
48. Id. at 290.
2016]
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with Title IX. And since institutions were now liable for the harassment
of one student against another if they had actual notice and were deliber-
ately indifferent, they could no longer afford to just ignore what hap-
pened in dorm rooms and fraternities. At the same time, however, the
Court showed that it would not hesitate to reign in the Department of
Education (DOE) if the justices disagreed with DOE's interpretation of
Title IX.
Despite the high standard of proof for liability, universities face sig-
nificant lawsuits. United Educator (UE), which provides insurance to
1,200-member universities, recently began offering insurance to cover
sexual assault payouts. Between 2006 and 2010, UE paid out $36 mil-
lion; 72% of the settlements were provided to parties suing the schools
for incidents of sexual assault.49 In 2014 the University of Connecticut
settled a $1.28 million suit, and the University of Colorado at Boulder
settled a suit for $825 thousand.50
A. Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights
Congress explicitly left enforcement of Title IX in the hands of the
departments and agencies that allocated federal funds to education pro-
grams and/or activities. These agencies were "authorized and directed"
to effectuate the prohibition against sexual discrimination. 5' They were
supposed to do so "by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general ap-
plicability., 52 Compliance with these rules could be achieved "(1) by the
termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such
program or activity.., or (2) by any other means authorized by law. 53
OCR has published three guides to how schools should adjudicate sexual
cases.
1. 1997 Guide
In 1997, OCR published its first official guidance in the Federal Reg-
ister on how schools should investigate and resolve allegations of sexual
49. Gayle Nelson, The High Cost of Sexual Assaults on Campuses, NON PROFIT QUARTERLY
(June 23, 2015), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2015/06/23/the-high-cost-of-sexual-assaults-on-
college-campuses/.
50. United Educators, Large Loss Report 2015, UE.ORG (2015),
https://www.ue.org/uploadedFiles/Large loss 2015 Final.pdf.
51. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2012).
52. Id.
53. Id.
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harassment.5 4 Before drafting the document, OCR met with representa-
tives from interested parties, including students, teachers, school admin-
istrators and researchers.55 It also twice publicly requested comments.56
In the 1997 guide, OCR enumerated certain factors that grievance
procedures should contain in order to be in compliance with Title IX.
They included provisions providing for notice to students and other in-
terested parties, such as "(a)dequate, reliable and impartial investigation
of complaints, including the opportunity to present witnesses and other
evidence"; "designated and reasonably prompt time frames for the maj or
stages of the complaint process"; notice of the outcome to the parties;
and "an assurance that the school will take steps to prevent reoccurrence
of any harassment and to correct its discriminatory effects on the com-
plainant and others, if appropriate.",57 OCR did not require that schools
create a separate policy to deal with sexual harassment but instead ex-
plicitly permitted schools to use a general student disciplinary proce-
dure.58
The 1997 Guide also discussed the due process rights of the accused.
OCR wrote "[t]he rights established under Title IX must be interpreted
consistently with any federally guaranteed rights involved in a complaint
proceeding., 59 In addition to constitutional rights, OCR recognized that
there could be additional rights created by state law, institutional regula-
tions and policies as well as collective bargaining.60 OCR emphasized
that respecting the procedural rights of both parties was an important part
of a just outcome. "Indeed, procedures that ensure the Title IX rights of
the complainant while at the same time according due process to both
parties involved will lead to sound and supportable decisions. Schools
should ensure that steps to accord due process rights do not restrict or
unnecessarily delay the protections provided by Title IX to the complain-
ant."
61
As mentioned earlier, in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
54. U.S. Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights, Sexual Harassment Guidance: Har-
assment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC.
(Mar. 13, 1997), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/sexharOl.html [hereinafter OCR
1997].
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
2016]
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District, the Supreme Court struck down part of the 1997 Guidance Doc-
ument concerning what showing should be required to recover damages
under Title IX.62 Gebser contended that the standard should be that set
forth in the 1997 Policy Guidance,63 which allowed liability "for even
one instance of quidpro quo harassment by a school employee in a posi-
tion of authority, such as a teacher or administrator, whether or not it
knew, should have known, or approved of the harassment at issue.,
64
Gebser argued that the Policy Guidance was entitled to "considerable
weight" and was "reasonable and fully consistent with the language and
the purpose of the statute., 65 The Supreme Court disagreed with Gebser
and by implication OCR, holding that to recover damages, a plaintiff
must show both knowledge66 and deliberate indifference.6
2. 2001 Guide
In 2001, OCR published a revised guide to sexual harassment under
Title IX in the Federal Register principally in response to the Supreme
Court's rulings in Gebser and Davis.68 As with the 1997 Guide, the 2001
62. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
63. !d. at 282.
64. See OCR [997, supra note 54 ("A school's liability for sexual harassment by its employees
is determined by application of agency principles, i.e., by principles governing the delegation of au-
thority to or authorization of another person to act on one's behalf Accordingly, a school will al-
ways be liable for even one instance of quid pro quo harassment by a school employee in a position
of authority, such as a teacher or administrator, whether or not it knew, should have known, or ap-
proved of the harassment at issue.").
65. Brief for Petitioner at 60-61, Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989
(1998) (No. 96-1866), 1998 WL 19745 ("The Court has 'long recognized that considerable weight
should be accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer.' Moreover, as we have explained, the OCR's interpretation of Title IX and the scope of
school district liability, and particularly its imposition of liability for the acts of those who are aided
in carrying out harassment by the authority granted over students, is reasonable and fully consistent
with the language and the purpose of the statute." (internal citations omitted)).
66. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 285 ("[W]e conclude that it would 'frustrate the purposes' of Title IX
to permit a damages recovery against a school district for a teacher's sexual harassment of a student
based on principles of respondeat superior or constructive notice, i.e., without actual notice to a
school district official.").
67. Id. at 290-91 ("We think, moreover, that the response must amount to deliberate indiffer-
ence to discrimination. The administrative enforcement scheme presupposes that an official who is
advised of a Title IX violation refuses to take action to bring the recipient into compliance. The
premise, in other words, is an official decision by the recipient not to remedy the violation. That
framework finds a rough parallel in the standard of deliberate indifference. Under a lower standard,
there would be a risk that the recipient would be liable in damages not for its own official decision
but instead for its employees' independent actions.").
68. U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, Revised Sexual Harassment Guid-
ance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students or Third Parties, U.S. DEP'T OF
SEXUAL ASSAULT ADJUDICATION
Guide went through notice and comment.69 Although the Supreme Court
had rejected the standard of liability advocated by OCR for liability in
private lawsuits, OCR emphasized that it still had the power to "'prom-
ulgate and enforce requirements that effectuate [Title IX's] nondiscrimi-
nation mandate,' even in circumstances that would not give rise to a
claim for money damages."' 0
As compared with the 1997 Guide, the biggest change to the 2001's
section on adjudication of sexual harassment complaints had to do with
its increased emphasis on the rights of the accused. The 2001 Guide
now had a section entitled, "Due Process Rights of the Accused.",71 In
addition to being slightly reorganized, this newly appointed section told
schools "the Family Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) does not override
federally protected due process rights of persons accused of sexual har-
assment.",72 It concluded by saying: "Schools should be aware of these
rights and their legal responsibilities to individuals accused of harass-
ment." 
73
3. 2011 Dear Colleague Letter
In 2011, OCR issued the Dear Colleague Letter (DCL), which it
deemed to be a "significant policy document," 74 i.e. disclaiming any sta-
tus as an independent legislative rule. OCR contended that the DCL
"does not add requirements to applicable law, but provides information
and examples to inform recipients about how OCR evaluates whether
covered entities are complying with their legal obligation.",
71
Unlike the 1997 and 2001 Guide, OCR did not post a formal notice
requesting feedback on the proposed changes. Many university officials
responsible for enforcing Title IX have voiced frustration with OCR for
not requesting input. As a university administrator at a state flagship uni-
versity stated, "I'm not sure if all of the mandates have been thought
EDUc. (Jan. 2001), https://www2.ed.gov/offices/OCR/archives/pdf shguide.pdf, [hereinafter OCR
2001]. In the 1997 Guide, OCR said that the standard of liability for monetary damages should be
"known or should have known," a standard that was clearly rejected in Gebser. See OCR 1997, su-
pra note 54.
69. OCR 2001, supra note 68, at ii.
70. Id.
71. Id. at22.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 3, at 1.
75. Id. at I n.1.
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through for all universities in all universities' context, it feels like stuff is
missing or there would have been benefit to talking to campus adminis-
trators who are already doing this." 
76
OCR laid out a number of recommendations and requirements in the
DCL, which will be discussed at length below. Three modifications to
the disciplinary proceedings, however, are of particular note: (1) OCR
strongly discouraged schools from allowing the parties to directly ques-
tion one another;77 (2) OCR told schools that they "should not allow the
alleged perpetrator to review the complainant's statement without also
allowing the complainant to review the alleged perpetrator's state-
ment"; 78 and (3) OCR required schools to set the standard of proof at
preponderance of the evidence rather than clear and convincing evidence
that some schools had been using.
B. Enforcement
The Department of Education (DOE) is currently investigating 241
post-secondary institutions regarding the way they handle sexual vio-
lence.79 Although a university has never lost federal funding for violat-
ing Title IX,8 0 DOE seems to be taking a more aggressive stance. As
mentioned earlier, OCR has found a number of schools to be in violation
of Title IX, including Princeton"1 and Harvard Law School.82  These
schools have since reached settlements with OCR in which they agreed
to change the way they handle sexual assault so as to meet the protocol
set forth in the DCL.1
3
On May 1, 2014, DOE released a list of forty-four colleges and uni-
versities under investigation14 and the list continues to grow. This infor-
76. Telephone Interview with an administrator at a flagship state university (Nov. 14, 2014).
This person was willing to be quoted on the record, but anonymously.
77. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 3, at 11-12.
78. Id.
79. See Campus Sexual Assault Under Investigation, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC.,
http://projects.chronicle.com/titleix/ (last visited June 1, 2016).
80. As of May 1, 2014, no university had ever lost funding for violating Title IX. See Tyler
Kingkade, 55 Colleges Face Sexual Assault Investigations, HUFFINGTON POST (July 1, 2014, 11:22
AM), http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/2014/05/01/college-sexual-assault n 5247267.html.
81. Princeton Violation, supra note 10.
82. Id.; Harvard Violation, supra note 11.
83. See Princeton Violation, supra note 10; Harvard Violation, supra note 11.
84. Press Office, U.S. Department of Education Releases List of Higher Education Institutions
with Open Title IX Sexual Violence Investigations, DEP'T OF EDUC. (May 1, 2014),
http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-releases-list-higher-education-
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mation was released even though the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) is statutorily barred from releasing the names of
those under investigation in Title VII cases,8" and "(a)ny person who
makes public information in violation of this subsection shall be fined
not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or
both., 86  Similarly, the Department of Justice has an explicit policy
against releasing information on current investigations except in unusual
circumstances.87 The reason for this non-disclosure policy is in part be-
cause "Justice Department guidelines, rules of professional conduct, and
rules of court, as well as considerations of fairness to defendants, require
that we not make comments that could prejudice a defendant's right to a
fair trial."88 Even if universities don't take the threat of losing federal
funding seriously, such public shaming may have an effect. Two recent
news articles have discussed how universities under suspicion for violat-
ing Title IX are receiving fewer applications from prospective students
and fewer donations from alumnae.8 9
II. IS THE DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER PROCEDURALLY VALID?
Determining whether universities must comply with the Dear Col-
league Letter requires figuring out whether it is legally valid. That hinges
on whether it is a legislative rule, an interpretive rule or merely some
form of guidance document. OCR claims that the DCL is a "significant
guidance document," but courts have sometimes held that a guidance
document can contain interpretive rules. 90 In either case, so long as the
DCL does not contain matters that can only be promulgated via a legisla-
tive rule,91 it would not need to go through formal rulemaking or infor-
institutions-open-title-i.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2012) ("Charges shall not be made public by the Commission.").
86. Id.
87. Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (June 23, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ri/frequently-asked-questions-0.
88. Id.
89. Gayle Nelson, The High Cost of Sexual Assaults on College Campuses, NON PROFIT
QUARTERLY (June 23, 2015), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2015/06/23/the-high-cost-of-sexual-
assaults-on-college-campuses/; Tyler Kingkade, Alumni Are Creating a Network to Put Pressure on
Universities over Sexual Assault, HUFFINGTON POST (May 28, 2014, 4:37 PM),
http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/2014/05/28/alumni-network-sexual-assault-
college n 5401194.html.
90. See generally Gen. Elec. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 290 F.3d 377, 383 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Unit-
ed States v. Brisbane, 367 F.3d 910, 914 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
91. The APA allows an agency to issue some binding legislative rules without going through
notice and comment (including for good cause), but the agency must assert any such exception. 5
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mal rulemaking's notice and comment.9 If the DCL is actually a legisla-
tive rule, however, then it will be procedurally invalid for not having
gone through the required rule making process. 93
A. Distinguishing Between Legislative and Non-Legislative Rules
The Department of Education has been "authorized and directed" to
enforce Title IX by issuing legislative rules.94 If substantively valid, leg-
islative rules have "the force and effect of a statute on all those who are
subject to [them] ... [and they] bind[] the agency, private parties, and
the courts, and may preempt state statutes." 95 Interpretive rules, on the
other hand, can be used to signal how an agency will interpret a rule, but
they do not bind agencies or the public.96  Agencies are also allowed to
issue guidance documents-a broad category of non-legislative rules,
which includes "interpretive memoranda, policy statements, guidances,
manuals, circulars, memoranda, bulletins, advisories, and the like.",
97
There is also a subset of guidance documents called "significant guid-
ance documents," which is what the DCL purports to be.98
Because legislative rules are legally binding, the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA) requires that they be promulgated in a way that allows
for public input and participation. That means they must be created
U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (2012). Because the OCR did not assert this exception, the exception does
not apply to the DCL.
92. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012).
93. See infra Part H.A.
94. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2012).
95. Peter L. Strauss, Comment, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L. J. 1463, 1467 (1992).
96. Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and InJbrmal Agency Policymaking, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 397, 399-400 (2007).
97. Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President, Final Bulletin for
Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432, 3434 (Jan. 25, 2007) [hereinafter Final Bulle-
tin].
98. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 3 at 1 n.I. The Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) has defined a significant guidance document as a guidance document which:
may reasonably be anticipated to: (i) Lead to an annual effect on the economy of
$ 100 million or more or adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of
the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or
safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities; or (ii) Create a serious
inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned by another
agency; or (iii) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user
fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients thereof, or (iv)
Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the President's pri-
orities, or the principles set forth in Executive Order 12866, as further amended.
Final Bulletin, supra note 97, at 3434.
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through formal rule making99 or by informal rule making, also known as
notice-and-comment.'O° Interpretive rules and guidance documents, on
the other hand, do not have the force of law, and so they do not have to
comply with these requirements.'0 ' Because significant guidance docu-
ments have a greater impact than usual guidance documents, The Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) requires that they pass through addi-
tional procedural hoops. "Not later than 180 days from the publication
of this Bulletin, each agency shall establish and clearly advertise on its
Web site a means for the public to submit electronically comments on
significant guidance documents, and to request electronically that signif-
icant guidance documents be issued, reconsidered, modified or rescind-
ed.",1
02
Congress,' 3 courts, 0 4 commentators,00 and even the White House10 6
have been concerned that agencies abuse guidance documents by prom-
ulgating new laws without going through notice and comment. In 2007,
99. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 556, 557 (2012). This process is more demanding and less common
than notice and comment. David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils
of the Short Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 282 (2010).
100. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)(3), (c) (2012); Franklin, supra note 99, at 282.
101. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A).
102. Final Bulletin, supra note 97, at 3437; Cf Sean Croston, The Petition is Mightier than the
Sword: Rediscovering an Old Weapon in the Battles Over "'Regulation Through Guidance", 63
ADMIN. L. REv. 381, 382-83 (2011).
103. H.R. REP. No. 106-1009, at 1 (2000) ("Regrettably, the committee's investigation found
that some guidance documents were intended to bypass the rulemaking process and expanded an
agency's power beyond the point at which Congress said it should stop. Such 'backdoor' regulation
is an abuse of power and a corruption of our Constitutional system.").
104. See Appalachian Power Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
The D.C. Circuit noted:
The phenomenon we see in this case is familiar. Congress passes a broadly worded
statute. The agency follows with regulations containing broad language, open-
ended phrases, ambiguous standards and the like. Then as years pass, the agency
issues circulars or guidance or memoranda, explaining, interpreting, defining and
often expanding the commands in regulations. One guidance document may yield
another and then another and so on. Several words in a regulation may spawn hun-
dreds of pages of text as the agency offers more and more detail regarding what its
regulations demand of regulated entities. Law is made, without notice and com-
ment, without public participation, and without publication in the Federal Register
or the Code of Federal Regulations.
Id.
105. See Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting SubstantiveJbr Procedural Review of Guidance Docu-
ments, 90 TEX. L. REv. 331, 352 (2011); Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements,
Guidances, Manuals and the Like-Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41
DUKE L.J. 1311, 1327 (1992). But see Connor N. Raso, Note, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agen-
cy Use of Guidance Documents, 119 YALE L.J. 782, 785 (2010).
106. Final Bulletin, supra note 97, at 3432 ("OMB has been concerned about the proper devel-
opment and use of agency guidance documents.").
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the Bush White House issued a Bulletin on Good Guidance Practices in
an attempt to reign in these undemocratic processes.' 0 7 Still, the problem
remains. Part of the reason why agencies are able to abuse guidance
documents is that it is difficult to distinguish between legislative and
non-legislative rules. David Franklin has called creating a workable dis-
tinction between the two perhaps the most "vexing conundrum in the
field of administrative law"'° 8-no surprise considering that courts have
said the distinction is "fuzzy"' 0 9 and "enshrouded in considerable
smog."''
110
As mentioned above, OCR termed the DCL a "significant guidance
document""' and did not promulgate it through formal rule making or
notice and comment. The test for whether the DCL is a legislative rule
and thus should have gone through the APA's required rulemaking pro-
cesses is whether it has a "legally binding" effect. 112
B. Did the DCL Effectively Amend a Prior Legislative Rule?
In American Mining Congress v. United States Department of La-
bor,"3 the D.C. Circuit set out a "particularly influential" ' 14 formulation
of the legal effect test. Determining whether a "purported interpretive
rule" has legal effect can be "best ascertained by asking (1) 'where, in
the absence of a legislative rule by the agency, the legislative basis for
107. See id.
108. David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short Cut,
120 YALE L.J. 276, 278 (2010). Franklin suggested what he called the "short cut" test as a way of
simplifying the distinction between legislative and interpretive rules. If a rule goes through notice
and comment it is legislative; if it does not, then it is interpretive. Id. at 279. Under that test, the
DCL would be a non-legislative rule because it did not go through notice and comment. Since non-
legislative rules do not need to go through notice and comment, the DCL would be procedurally val-
id. Id. Despite the beguiling simplicity of the short cut test, which would "economize on judicial
decision costs by eliminating at one stroke the need for courts to divine the intrinsic nature or pur-
pose of any challenged rule or to develop any elaborate test for distinguishing between legislative
and nonlegislative rules," Franklin acknowledged that no courts have adopted it. Id. at 279, 294-
303.
109. Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing Cmty. Nutrition
Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
110. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing Legislative Rulesfrom Interpretive Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 547, 547-48
(2000).
111. Final Bulletin, supra note 97.
112. William Funk, A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 1321, 1326 (2001).
113. Am. Mining Cong. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 995 F.2d 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
114. PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 194 (Founda-
tion Press, 11th ed. (2011)).
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agency enforcement would be inadequate";".5 (2) whether the agency has
published the rule in the Code of Federal Regulations; 16 or (3) whether
the rule effectively amends a prior legislative rule."11 If the answer to
any of these questions is "yes," we have a legislative and not an interpre-
tive rule. The last factor has been seen as the most important."' The
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has used all or part of this same test to de-
termine if each of the following were legislative rules: a Federal Aviation
Association internal guidance document, "9 an EPA Guidance Docu-
ment, 120 and Training and Employment Guidance Letters issued by the
Department of Labor.121 In other words, if the 2001 Guidance Document
is legislative and the DCL effectively amended it, then it is a legislative
rule and not an interpretative rule, a policy document, or a guidance doc-
ument. If it is a legislative rule, the DCL will be invalid.
1. Is the 2001 Guidance Document a Legislative Rule?
Deciding whether the DCL amends a legislative rule requires first
determining whether the 2001 Guidance Document, which the DCL
amends and sometimes replaces, is itself a legislative rule. In issuing the
2001 Guidance Document, OCR explicitly invoked its general authori-
ty, 122 and it used mandatory language. 123 Although the agency did not ac-
tually claim it was engaged in rule making in 2001, it complied with all
the requirements for rule making and probably needed to do so to make
some of the pronouncements in that document legally valid.
The 2001 Guidance Document was issued in order to revise the 1997
Guidance Document in light of two Supreme Court decisions. 124 Alt-
hough the legal status of the 1997 Guidance could be debated, a strong
argument exists that it was in fact what it proclaimed to be. On the one
hand, OCR complied with the requirements for rule making, 125 and the
115. Am. Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at 1109.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See Connor N. Raso, Note, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency Use of Guidance Doc-
uments, 119 YALE L.J. 782, 789 (2010).
119. See Ass'n of Flight Attendants-CWA v. Huerta, 785 F.3d 710, 716 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
120. See Nat'l Res. Def. Council v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 643 F.3d 311, 321 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
121. See Mendoza v. Perez, 754 F.3d 1002, 1020-21 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
122. OCR 2001, supra note 68, at ii.
123. Id. at 15.
124. OCR 2001, supra note 68, at 2; see also Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S.
274, 282 (1998); Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
125. OCR 1997, supra note 54, at 12035.
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1997 policy Guidance was published in the Federal Register. 126 On the
other hand, unlike the 2001 Guidance Document and the DCL, OCR did
not specifically invoke its authority to issue the 1997 Guidance Docu-
ment. Nor did it use the kind of mandatory language that appeared in
both the 2001 Guidance Document and the DCL. Additionally, in its
amicus brief in Gebser, OCR explicitly referred to the 1997 Guidance
Document as guidance and not a legislative rule. 127
The 2001 Guidance Document was also published in the Federal
Register, 128 and OCR complied with the requirements for informal rule
making by going through notice and comment.129 Unlike the 1997 Guid-
ance, the 2001 Guidance Document contained the kind of mandatory
language associated with legislative rules. For instance, it said, "Regard-
less of whether the student who was harassed, or his or her parent, de-
cides to file a formal complaint or otherwise request action on the stu-
dent's behalf ... the school must promptly investigate to determine what
occurred and then take appropriate steps to resolve the situation."'3 In
contrast, the 1997 Guidance Document stated, "Once a school has notice
of possible sexual harassment of students ... it should take immediate
and appropriate steps to investigate or otherwise determine what oc-
curred and take steps reasonably calculated to end any harassment, elim-
inate a hostile environment if one has been created, and prevent harass-
ment from occurring again."''
In light of the way that the 2001 Guidance Document was promul-
gated, the fact that OCR explicitly invoked its general legislative authori-
ty, and the fact that on at least one occasion it used mandatory language,
there is a strong argument that it is a legislative rule.
126. See generally OCR 1997, supra note 54.
127. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 43 n.18, Gebser v.
Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998) (No. 96-1866), 1998 WL 19745 ("In Rosa H.,
the Fifth Circuit declined to defer to the Department's policy guidance on sexual harassment in cases
where the sexual harassment had occurred before issuance of the guidance. The court thereby mis-
takenly treated the guidance as legislative in nature-i.e., as prescribing new norms of conduct, ra-
ther than as an interpretation of an unchanged statutory provision." (citations omitted)) (Rosa H.
refers to Rosa H. v. San Elizario Independent School District, 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997)).
128. OCR 1997, supra note 54, at 12034.
129. OCR 2001, supra note 68, at 2 ("The guidance was the product of extensive consultation
with interested parties, including students, teachers, school administrators, and researchers. We also
made the document available for public comment.").
130. OCR 2001, supra note 68, at 15 (emphasis added).
131. OCR 1997, supra note 54, at 12042 (emphasis added).
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2. Did the DCL Effectively Amend the 2001 Guidance Document?
If the 2001 Guidance Document was a legislative rule, the key ques-
tion is whether the DCL "effectively amended" it. Changes were made
in a number of areas, including how schools should handle police inves-
tigations, what the standard of proof should be, requirements regarding
witnesses, the provision of information, lawyers, the right to appeal, how
notice should be provided, protocol for handling retaliation, mandates for
providing remedies, and how OCR would enforce compliance. Note that
even if the 2001 Guidance Document was not a legislative rule, the test
from American Mining Congress will still be used to see if the DCL is
invalid on its own for having legal effect.'
32
a. Grievance Procedures
The 2001 Guidance Document explicitly tells schools they are al-
lowed to use informal mechanisms for resolving sexual harassment, as
long as both parties agree. Later, it tells schools that mediation is inap-
propriate for sexual assault, even if parties would participate voluntarily:
Grievance procedures may include informal mechanisms for resolving
sexual harassment complaints to be used if the parties agree to do so....
In some cases, such as alleged sexual assaults, mediation will not be ap-
propriate even on a voluntary basis. 1
3 3
The DCL, however, limits the use of voluntary mechanisms to only
some types of sexual harassment. The DCL also states that mediation is
inappropriate in cases of sexual assault:
Grievance procedures generally may include voluntary informal mecha-
nisms (e.g., mediation) for resolving some types of sexual harassment
complaints.... [I]n cases involving allegations of sexual assault, media-
tion is not appropriate even on a voluntary basis. 
1 34
The difference between the 2001 Guidance and the DCL is subtle but
significant. Although the 2001 Guidance Document limits the use of
mediation, it does not limit the use of other types of informal mecha-
nisms. The DCL on the other hand seems to equate all informal mecha-
nisms with mediation and limits their use. That means that a school
132. See text infra Part I.C.
133. OCR 2001, supra note 68, at 21.
134. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 3, at 8.
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would have been able to implement restorative justice processes under
the 2001 Guidance but probably not under the DCL.
b. Police Investigation
The 2001 Guidance Document had discussed how schools should
handle an ongoing police investigation regarding the underlying harass-
ment. Although it reminded schools that they had an obligation to re-
spond promptly and effectively on their own regardless of whether there
was an ongoing police investigation, it did not provide specifics about
what they should do. The 2001 Guidance stated:
In some instances, a complainant may allege harassing conduct that con-
stitutes both sex discrimination and possible criminal conduct. Police in-
vestigations or reports may be useful in terms of fact gathering. However,
because legal standards for criminal investigations are different, police in-
vestigations or reports may not be determinative of whether harassment
occurred under Title IX and do not relieve the school of its duty to respond
promptly and effectively.1
3 5
The DCL, in contrast, provides much more elaborate instructions for
what schools should do when there is a concurrent police investigation.
As is evident from the text below, there is no flexibility in these instruc-
tions. OCR is telling schools what they must do to comply with their ob-
ligations under Title IX:
Schools should not wait for the conclusion of a criminal investigation or
criminal proceedings to begin their own Title IX investigation and, if
needed, must take immediate steps to protect the student in the educational
setting. For example a school should not delay conducting its own inves-
tigation or taking steps to protect the complainant because it wants to see
whether the alleged perpetrator will be found guilty of a crime. Any
agreement or Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with a local police
department must allow the school to meet its Title IX obligation to resolve
complaints promptly and equitably. Although a school may need to delay
temporarily the fact-finding portion of a Title IX investigation while the
police are gathering evidence, once notified that the police department has
completed its gathering of evidence (not the ultimate outcome of the in-
vestigation or the filing of any charges), the school must promptly resume
and complete its fact-finding for the Title IX investigation. Moreover,
nothing in an MOU or the criminal investigation itself should prevent a
school from notifying complainants of their Title XI rights and the
school's grievance procedures, or from taking interim steps to ensure the
135. OCR 2001, supra note 68, at 21.
[Vol. 64
SEXUAL ASSAULT ADJUDICATION
safety and well-being of the complainant and the school community while
the law enforcement agency's fact-gathering is in process. OCR also rec-
ommends that a school's MOU include clear policies on when a school
will refer a matter to local law enforcement.'
36
The difference between the 2001 Guidance and the DCL is striking.
The 2001 Guidance provided almost no direction regarding how schools
should handle police investigations except to say that a police investiga-
tion may not be determinative of whether there was a Title IX violation
and that schools still had an obligation to respond promptly and effec-
tively. The DCL in contrast tells schools that they must not wait for an
investigation to end but must take immediate steps to protect the com-
plainant. It dictates the relationship between schools and the police, tell-
ing schools that any formal understanding between the police and
schools must allow the schools to meet their Title IX obligation of
prompt investigation. It then tells schools that even if they have to wait
for the police to finish their investigation that they must promptly resume
after the police fact-finding portion is done. In effect, DOE is telling
schools what they must do without knowing the needs of law enforce-
ment or the local prosecutor's office. One can imagine a university be-
ing placed in a difficult situation because law enforcement requests more
time to investigate a case beyond the initial fact finding portion and be-
lieves that the school's investigation might impair their investigation but
the school is left with no choice but to disregard law enforcement or face
sanction from DOE.
c. The Standard of Proof
The 2001 Guidance Document contained a section on "Prompt and
Equitable Grievance Procedures."' 137 It specifically told schools that they
did not need to set up separate grievance procedures for handling sexual
harassment cases. 138 It did "identif[y] a number of elements in evaluat-
ing whether a school's grievance procedures were prompt and equita-
ble."' 139 These included notice, "[a]dequate, reliable, and impartial inves-
tigation of complaints, including the opportunity to present witnesses and
other evidence" and "[d]esignated and reasonably prompt timeframes for
136. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 3, at 10 (emphasis added).
137. OCR 2001, supra note 68, at 19.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 20.
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the major stages of the complaint process.' 140  At no point did it tell
schools that the standard of proof needed to be set at a certain level.
The DCL, in contrast, tells schools in unequivocal terms that the
standard of proof must be set at preponderance of the evidence. It states,
"in order for a school's grievance procedures to be consistent with Title
IX standards, the school must use a preponderance of the evidence stand-
ard.' 14 ' It also specifically acknowledges that in setting the standard of
proof at preponderance, it will be forcing some schools to change their
existing standard of proof. "The 'clear and convincing' standard ... cur-
rently used by some schools, is a higher standard of proof Grievance
procedures that use this higher standard are inconsistent with the stand-
ard of proof established for violations of the civil rights laws, and are
thus not equitable under Title IX.'
' 42
d. Witnesses and Information
As mentioned above, the 2001 Guidance document identified a num-
ber of elements that the DOE looked for in evaluating whether the
school's grievance procedures were prompt and equitable. Among oth-
ers, it told schools that there must be "[a]dequate, reliable, and impartial
investigation of complaints, including the opportunity to present wimess-
es and other evidence.' 43
The DCL, in contrast sets out new rules for how schools should insti-
tute this element. It states, "[t]hroughout a school's Title IX investiga-
tion, including at any hearing, the parties must have an equal opportunity
to present witnesses and other evidence. The complainant and the al-
leged perpetrator must be afforded similar and timely access to any in-
formation that will be used at the hearing.' 44
The DCL changed the student disciplinary procedure in fundamental
ways. A school might have concluded that since the accused faces disci-
plinary sanction that it is he who should know the information that will
be presented against him at the hearing and have the right to present evi-
dence on his own behalf. The DCL has effectively altered the proceed-
ings so that there are now three people putting on evidence: the school,
the accused, and the complainant. By mandating the complainant's equal
140. Id.
141. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 3, at 11 (emphasis added).
142. Id.
143. OCR 2001, supra note 68, at 20.
144. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 3, at 11 (emphasis added).
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right to call witnesses and put on evidence it is extending the length of
the hearings, and it is removing from schools the right to decide what ev-
idence is relevant and should be admitted. Further, by requiring that both
parties have similar and timely access to information, it is forcing
schools to adjust their processes and shift resources so that they are able
to meet these time requirements to two parties when before there was just
one.
e. Lawyers
The 2001 Guidance document did not mention lawyers at all, thus
taking no view as to whether the accused could or should have legal rep-
resentation in university disciplinary proceedings. The DCL in contrast
mandates that schools give parties equal access to attorneys and that both
attorneys have the same restrictions on their ability to speak or put on ev-
idence. It states:
While OCR does not require schools to permit parties to have lawyers at
any stage of the proceedings, if a school chooses to allow the parties to
have the lawyers participate in the proceedings, it must so do equally for
both sides. Additionally, any school-imposed restrictions on the ability of
lawyers to speak or otherwise participate in the proceeding should apply
equally. 145
In effect, OCR limits a university's right to decide how it wants to
handle counsel. Requiring that a school provide equal access and equal
time may increase costs because if the school provides for counsel for the
accused, it must now provide counsel for the complainant as well.
f. Appeals
The 2001 Guidance document acknowledges that some schools may
provide a right to appeal, but it did not provide any particulars about the
way it should work, saying only "[m]any schools also provide an oppor-
tunity to appeal the findings or remedy, or both.', 146 The DCL, in con-
trast, adds specific requirements for the appeals process, if a school
chooses to have one: "OCR also recommends that schools provide an
appeals process. If a school provides for appeal of the findings or reme-
145. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
146. OCR 2001, supra note 68, at 20.
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dy, it must do so for both parties."' 147
Once again, OCR is making the disciplinary process more resource
expensive and time consuming since universities that once provided only
the accused with the right to appeal must now provide that right to the
complainant as well.
g. Notice of Outcome
The 2001 Guidance document told schools that one of the elements it
would consider in evaluating its grievance procedures was whether it
provided notice to the parties of the outcome. 148 The document did not
specify what form that notice should take. The DCL in contrast, tells
schools that notice is required, and that it must be in writing: "Both par-
ties must be notified, in writing, about the outcome of both the complaint
and any appeal.',
149
h. Retaliation
The 2001 Guidance document told schools that they "should take
steps to prevent any further harassment and to prevent retaliation against
the student who made the complaint (or was the subject of the harass-
ment), against the person who filed a complaint on behalf of a student, or
against those who provided information as witnesses."'"5 At a minimum,
it said, schools should make sure that harassed students and their parents
know how to report these problems and that the school should make fol-
low up inquiries to see if there have been any additional incidents of re-
taliation.'' It then said that counseling may be appropriate for the of-
fender and that depending on how widespread the harassment was, they
may need to provide training to the larger community for recognizing
harassment and knowing how to respond. 152 Later it stated: "In addition,
because retaliation is prohibited by Title IX, schools may want to include
a provision in their procedures prohibiting retaliation against any indi-
vidual who files a complaint or participates in a harassment inquiry.',
153
147. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 3, at 12 (emphasis added).
148. OCR 2001, supra note 68, at 20.
149. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 3, at 13 (emphasis added).
150. OCR 2001, supra note 68, at 17 (emphasis added).
151. Id. (emphasis added).
152. Id. (emphasis added).
153. Id. at 20.
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The DCL, in contrast tells schools that they "must have policies and
procedures in place to protect against retaliatory harassment."' 5 4 It then
mandates how this should be done. "At a minimum, schools must ensure
that complainants and their parents, if appropriate, know how to report
any subsequent problems, and should follow-up with complainants to de-
termine whether any retaliation or new incidents of harassment have oc-
curred."' 15 5
i. Remedies
The 2001 Guide told schools that they must respond immediately
once they had notice of a student harassing another student. If they re-
sponded immediately, the 2001 Guide stated that they would not be re-
sponsible for taking additional steps:
As long as the school, upon notice of the harassment, responds by taking
prompt and effective action to end the harassment and prevent its recur-
rence, the school has carried out its responsibility under the Title IX regu-
lations. On the other hand, if, upon notice, the school fails to take prompt,
effective action, the school's own inaction has permitted the student to be
subjected to a hostile environment that denies or limits the student's abil-
ity to participate in or benefit from the school's program on the basis of
sex. In this case, the school is responsible for taking effective corrective
actions to stop the harassment, prevent its recurrence, and remedy the ef-
fects on the victim that could reasonably have been prevented had it re-
sponded promptly and effectively.1
5 6
The DCL, in contrast, tells schools that they are responsible for rem-
edying the effects on the victim regardless of whether they responded in
a timely fashion:
As discussed above, if a school determines that sexual harassment that
creates a hostile environment has occurred, it must take immediate action
to eliminate the hostile environment, prevent its recurrence, and address its
effects. In addition to counseling or taking disciplinary action against the
harasser, effective corrective action may require remedies for the com-
plainant, as well as changes to the school's overall services or policies....
Depending on the specific nature of the problem, remedies for the com-
plainant might include, but are not limited to: providing an escort to en-
sure that the complainant can move safely between classes and activities;
ensuring that the complainant and alleged perpetrator do not attend the
154. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 3, at 16 (emphasis added).
155. Id. (emphasis added).
156. OCR 2001, supra note 68, at 21.
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same classes; moving the complainant or alleged perpetrator to a different
residence hall ... ; providing counseling services; providing medical ser-
vices; providing academic support services, such as tutoring; arranging for
the complainant to re-take a course or withdraw from a class without pen-
alty, including ensuring that any changes do not adversely affect the com-
plainant's academic record; and reviewing any disciplinary action taken
against the complainant to see if there is a causal connection between the
harassment and the misconduct that may have resulted in the complainant
being disciplined.157
These changes are significant. The 2001 Guidance Document told
schools that if, upon notice of harassment, they took prompt and effec-
tive action to end the harassment and prevent its recurrence they would
have carried out their responsibility under Title IX. It was only if they
did not take prompt and effective action that they would be responsible
for remedying the effects of the harassment on the victim. In contrast,
the DCL makes schools responsible for remedying the effects on the vic-
tim regardless of how quickly or effectively they responded. This
change significantly increases the financial burden on schools, as they
must now provide for extensive services that they would not have had to
otherwise.
j. Enforcement
The DCL is also much more heavy-handed than the 2001 Guidance
document on enforcement. The 2001 Guidance makes it clear that if a
school takes certain steps it will be found to be in compliance with Title
IX, even if actual harassment occurred. The Guidance states in relevant
part:
If the school has taken, or agrees to take, each of these steps, OCR will
consider the case against the school resolved and will take no further ac-
tion, other than monitoring compliance with an agreement, if any, between
the school and OCR. This is true in cases in which the school was in vio-
lation of the Title IX regulations ... as well as those in which there had
been no violation of the regulations .... This is because, even if OCR
identifies a violation, Title IX requires OCR to attempt to secure voluntary
compliance. Thus, because a school will have the opportunity to take rea-
sonable corrective action before OCR issues a formal finding of violation
a school does not risk losing its Federal funding solely because discrimi-
157. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 3, at 15-17.
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nation occurred. 1
58
The DCL, in contrast, takes a markedly more punitive tone. Alt-
hough it acknowledges that it seeks voluntary compliance, it emphasizes
the consequences of not complying instead of the positive effects of
complying. The DCL states:
When OCR finds that a school has not taken prompt and effective steps to
respond to sexual harassment or violence, OCR will seek appropriate rem-
edies for both the complainant and the broader student population. When
conducting Title IX enforcement activities, OCR seeks to obtain voluntary
compliance from recipients. When a recipient does not come into compli-
ance voluntarily, OCR may initiate proceedings to withdraw Federal fund-
ing by the Department or refer the case to the U.S. Department of Justice
for ligation. 1W
k. General Tone
One striking part of the 2001 Guidance Document is its emphasis on
the rights of the accused student. Just as with in the 1997 Guide, the
2001 Guide discussed the due process rights of the accused. In the 1997
Guide, OCR wrote "the rights established under title IX must be inter-
preted consistently with any federally guaranteed rights involved in a
complaint proceeding.' 160 In addition to constitutional rights, OCR rec-
ognized in the 1997 Guide that state law, institutional regulations and
policies and collective bargaining could create additional rights for ac-
cused students. 16  In the 1997 Guide OCR emphasized that respecting
the procedural rights of both parties was an important part of a just out-
come. "Indeed, procedures that ensure the Title IX rights of the com-
plainant while at the same time according due process to both parties in-
volved will lead to sound and supportable decisions .... Schools should
ensure that steps to accord due process rights do not restrict or unneces-
sarily delay the protections provided by Title IX to the complainant."'
' 62
In comparison with the 1997 Guide, the 2001 Guide actually stressed
the importance of the rights of the accused to an even greater degree.
The 2001 guide included a new section entitled, "Due Process Rights of
158. OCR 2001, supra note 68, at 14-15.
159. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 3, at 16.
160. OCR 1997, supra note 54.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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the Accused."' 163 This newly appointed section contained all of the lan-
guage discussed above from the 1997 Guidance Document, but it also
told schools "the Family Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) does not over-
ride federally protected due process rights of Persons accused of sexual
harassment." 164 The 2001 Guidance concluded by saying, "[s]chools
should be aware of these rights and their legal responsibilities to individ-
uals accused of harassment."' 165 Thus it was understandable based on
both the 1997 and 2001 Guidance Documents that an institution would
think it could set a standard of proof at clear and convincing evidence or
even beyond a reasonable doubt.
In a significant about-face, the DCL deemphasizes the due process
rights of respondents. The section entitled, "Due Process of the Ac-
cused" is deleted. Missing is any explicit mention of the Constitution's
due process guarantee and that rights under Title IX must be interpreted
consistently with any federally guaranteed due process rights. Absent is
any acknowledgement of additional rights that might have been granted
by a state or the particular institution. Instead, in marked contrast to its
prior guidelines, the DCL almost begrudgingly states that schools must
provide alleged perpetrators with due process. It devotes just one sen-
tence to the rights of the accused: "Public and state-supported schools
must provide due process to the alleged perpetrator." 166 Tellingly, it fol-
lows that sentence by once again emphasizing the rights of alleged vic-
tims: "However, schools should ensure that steps taken to accord due
process rights to the alleged perpetrator do not restrict or unnecessarily
delay the Title IX protections for the complainant.'
67
3. Summary
Under the "legal effect" test as articulated by American Mining Con-
gress, a "purported interpretive rule" has legal affect if it effectively
amends a legislative rule. Although American Mining Congress con-
cerned Program Policy Letters, courts have used the same test to evaluate
purported guidance documents, like the DCL. The 2001 Guidance Doc-
ument is probably a legislative rule. It meets the procedural requirements
of a legislative rule because it went through notice and comment. It also
163. OCR 2001, supra note 68, at 31.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 3, at 12.
167. Id.
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meets two of the substantive parts of a legislative rule in that OCR ex-
plicitly invoked its general legislative authority, and on at least one occa-
sion it used mandatory language. Whatever the 2001 Guidance is, there
can be little doubt that the DCL effectively amended it. As detailed
above, the DCL adds many requirements that are not part of the 2001
Guidance. In addition, the general tone of these changes is to downplay
the procedural due process rights of the accused, which is a repudiation
of the 2001 Guidance's emphasis on these rights. If a court finds that the
DCL effectively amended a legislative rule then it will be deemed proce-
durally invalid. What is more, even if a court were to find that the 2001
Guidance Document was not a legislative rule, the DCL might still be
held invalid if it has the force of law, i.e. impermissibly imposes legal
obligations that require legislative rulemaking. 1
68
C. Does the DCL have the Force of Law?
In General Electric Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, in an
opinion authored by then Chief Judge and now Justice Ruth Bader Gins-
burg, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
was asked to decide whether an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Guidance Document was actually a legislative rule. The court wrote that
in deciding how to draw the line between legislative rules and statements
of policy, "we have considered whether the agency action (1) 'imposes
any rights and obligations' or (2) 'genuinely leaves the agency and its
decisionmakers free to exercise discretion.'"169 It went on further, "if a
statement denies the decisionmaker discretion in the area of its coverage,
so that [the agency] will automatically decline to entertain challenges to
the statement's position then the statement is binding, and creates rights
or obligations. 170
At issue in General Electric was whether the guidelines for how to
conduct a risk assessment on sampling, cleaning up or disposing of PCB
remediation waste were legislative or merely advisory. General Electric
168. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 290 F.3d 377, 382 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
169. Id. (quoting Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Chamber
of Commerce v. Dep't of Labor, 174 F.3d 206, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
170. Id. (quoting McLouth Steel Prod. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1320 (D.C. Cir.
1988)); see also Miller v. Cal. Speedway Corp., 536 F.3d 1020, 1033 (9th Cir. 2008). In Miller, the
Ninth Circuit articulated a similar test: "Interpretive rules merely explain, but do not add to, the sub-
stantive law that already exists in the form of a 'statute or legislative rule,' whereas legislative rules
,create rights, impose obligations or affect a change in existing law pursuant to authority delegated
by Congress."' Id. (quoting Hemp Indus. Ass'n v. DEA, 333 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003)).
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had argued that the Guidance document was a legislative rule "because it
gives substance to the vague language" of the statute at issue and it "does
so in an obligatory fashion.' 1 ' The EPA countered that the Guidance
Document did not have the force of law "because it does not purport to
be benign and because it has not been applied as though it were bind-
ing.' 172 In finding that the Guidelines were legislative, the court empha-
sized the language of the Guidance Document at issue. It noted that the
Document twice used the word "must" and it explained, "To the appli-
cant reading the Guidance Document the message is clear: in reviewing
applications the Agency will not be open to considering approaches other
than those prescribed in the Document."' 
17
Like the Guidance Document in General Electric, the DCL purports
to be a non-binding statement that "does not add requirements to appli-
cable law, but provides information and examples to inform recipients
about how OCR evaluates whether covered entities are complying with
their legal obligations."' 174 As General Electric and other cases show,
however, even if an agency purports to be issuing an interpretive rule,
courts may still find that it exercises power that can only be invoked in a
legislative rule.171 "It is well-established that an agency may not escape
the notice and comment requirements ... by labeling a major substantive
legal addition to a rule a mere interpretation.",176  A court must "'still
look to whether the interpretation itself carries the force and effect of
law,.., or rather whether it spells out a duty fairly encompassed within
the regulation that the interpretation purports to construe.'177
Using the legal effect test as articulated in General Electric, it is
clear that the DCL is a legislative rule on its own terms even if the earlier
171. Id.
172. Id. at 383.
173. Id. at 384.
174. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 3, at 1 n.1.
175. See Appalachian Power Co. v Envtl. Prot. Agency, 208 F.3d 1015, 1023, 1028 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (holding in a unanimous decision that the guidance document was a legislative rule despite
issuing a disclaimer at the beginning of the document saying: "The policies set forth in this paper are
intended solely as guidance, do not represent final Agency action, and cannot be relied upon to cre-
ate any rights enforceable by any party."); see also McLouth Steel Prod. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d
1317, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that the EPA's vertical and horizontal spread model is a rule
and not a policy).
176. Appalachian Power Co., 208 F.3d at 1024. But see, SBC Inc. v. FCC, 414 F.3d 486, 495
(3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. FCC, 672 F.2d 1034, 1042 (2d Cir. 1982)) ("An agen-
cy's determination that 'its order is interpretive,' and therefore not subject to notice and comment
requirements, 'in itself is entitled to a significant degree of deference."').
177. Appalachian Power Co., 208 F.3d at 1024 (internal citations omitted).
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2001 Guidance was not. As explained above, on multiple occasions,
OCR tells schools that they must take certain steps in order to be in com-
pliance with Title IX. Specifically, DCL tells schools:
(1) They may only use informal mechanisms to address some forms of
sexual harassment.
1 78
(2) "Any agreement or Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with a po-
lice department must allow the school to meet its Title IX obligation to re-
solve complaints promptly and equitably."' 
179
(3) "Although a school may need to delay temporarily the fact-finding
portion of at Title IX investigation while the police are gathering evidence,
once notified that the police department has completed its gathering of ev-
idence (not the ultimate outcome of the investigation or the filing of any
charges), the school must promptly resume and complete its fact-finding
for the Title XI investigation."
180
(4) "... . [I]n order for a school's grievance procedures to be consistent
with Title IX standards, the school must use a preponderance of the evi-
dence standard."
' 18 1
(5) "(T)he parties must have an equal opportunity to present witnesses and
other evidence."
' 18 2
(6) "The complainant and the alleged perpetrator must be afforded similar
and timely access to any information that will be used at the hearing."
8 3
(7) "If a school chooses to allow the parties to have their lawyers partici-
pate in the proceedings, it must do so equally for both sides."
(8) "If a school provides for appeal of the findings or remedy, it must do
so for both parties.',
18 5
(9) "Both parties must be notified, in writing, about the outcome of both
the complaint and any appeal."1
86
178. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 3, at 8 (emphasis added).
179. Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
180. Id. (emphasis added).
181. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
182. Id. (emphasis added).
183. Id. (emphasis added).
184. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
185. Id. (emphasis added).
186. Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
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(10) Schools must have policies and procedures to protect against retalia-
tory harassment,18 and they must ensure that both complainants and their
parents know how to report problems. 188
(11) "(I)f a school determines that sexual harassment that creates a hostile
environment occurred, it must take immediate action to eliminate the hos-
tile environment, prevent its recurrence, and address its effects."
189
"On its face" the DCL "imposes binding obligations" upon
schools.190 It does not leave "the agency and its decisionmakers free to
exercise discretion." 191 Just as in Appalachian Power Co. v. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, "[t]he entire Guidance, from beginning to
end.., reads like a ukase. It commands, it requires, it orders it dic-
tates. ',192 In other words, the DCL has "the force of law."'193  Such lan-
guage also specifically violates OMB's Final Bulletin for Agency Good
Guidance Practices, which states:
Each significant guidance document shall... [n]ot include mandatory
language such as "shall," "must," "required" or "requirement," unless
the agency is using these words to describe a statutory or regulatory re-
quirement, or the language is addressed to agency staff and will not fore-
close agency consideration of positions advanced by affected private par-
t. 194ties.
Since the DCL is a procedural rule and did not go through either
formal or informal rulemaking, it is procedurally invalid, and universities
have no legal obligation to adhere to it.
D. Has the DCL Effectively Left Schools No Other Choice?
Even if the DCL does not have the force and effect of law, the DCL
has made the consequences for not abiding by it so significant that it is
effectively legally binding. In Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Department
of Labor,195 the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
187. Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
188. Id. (emphasis added).
189. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
190. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 390 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
191. Id. at 382 (internal citations omitted).
192. Appalachian Power Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 208 F.3d 1015, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
193. Gen. Elec. Co., 390 F.3d at 385.
194. Final Bulletin, supra note 97, at 3440.
195. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 174 F.3d 206 (D.C. Cit. 1999).
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engaged in conduct similar to what DOE has been doing here. At issue
was an OSHA directive telling agencies that they would not inspect
workplaces as frequently or thoroughly if the employer abided by certain
safety standards, which were being set forth for the first time. 196 The
D.C. Circuit struck this directive down as being procedurally invalid on
the ground that the burden of inspections was so great that employers had
no real choice except to avoid them, which in effect made the directive
binding. 197
Similarly, in the DCL, OCR told academic institutions that if they
didn't take certain measures (like lowering the burden of proof) they
would be found in violation of Title IX. In an unprecedented move,
OCR began publishing a list of universities under investigation for vio-
lating Title IX, which put tremendous financial and social pressure on
schools to comply with the DCL. Even universities that may believe the
DCL is procedurally or substantively invalid are rolling over and com-
plying because the cost of not doing so is simply too high. In essence,
OCR's actions have transformed what could have been a legitimate guid-
ance document (if it had not had language that gave it the force of law)
into something that is legally binding.
E. Summary
The DCL effectively amended a legislative rule, which means that it
is invalid. Alternately, even if the DCL did not amend a legislative rule it
has the force of law, and so could only be promulgated as a legislative
rule. In addition, because OCR has made the consequences of not com-
plying with the DCL so deleterious for schools OCR has effectively
made the DCL legally binding. The consequence of each and all of these
arguments is that the DCL is invalid and that a court should refuse to en-
force it.
III. How SHOULD UNIVERSITIES ADDRESS ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL
ASSAULT?
If the DCL is invalid, that leaves the 1997 and 2001 Guidance Doc-
uments in place, 98 which give universities significantly more flexibility
196. Id. at 208.
197. Id. at 213.
198. The 2001 Guidance may be procedurally invalid for being a legislative rule. See supra Part
I.B. 1. The 1997 Guidance, however, does not seem to have this same problem. See supra Part
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in deciding how to address allegations of sexual assault.' 99 Although
OCR could try and enforce provisions from the DCL, it would have to do
so via individual enforcement actions and without relying on the DCL.
Alternatively, OCR could either issue a new guidance document that is
procedurally valid, or it could try to promulgate the currently mandatory
provisions of the DCL through informal rulemaking, i.e. notice-and-
comment rulemaking.
In deciding what processes to put in place, both universities and
OCR would be wise to remember Title IX's purpose. Title IX aims to
create equality in the classroom, and ending sexual assault and harass-
ment is a necessary means to achieving that end. Thus it is imperative
that schools institute processes that give women decision-making power.
They must have a say in determining how they want to address what
happened to them. Anything short of that undermines Title IX's goal of
equality and denies women the respect and dignity they deserve. Grant-
ing women a voice in the process is not just important on some meta-
physical level; studies show that it is what victims need to recover from
trauma. As Mary Koss explains, "[the] consensus of published studies is
that sexual assault victims need to ... above all have choice and input
into the resolution of their violation.,
200
Universities should not rely solely on the threat of external sanctions
to protect prospective victims, but also should set up processes that en-
201courage internally driven compliance. Using the threat of punishment
to deter assault (which is what universities are currently doing) is only
partially effective. Studies have shown that it is perception of the cer-
tainty of punishment (as opposed to the magnitude of the punishment)
that drives individuals to change their behavior. 2  An external punish-
ment model of social control is particularly unsuited for sexual assault,
I.B. 1.
199. The DCL explicitly states that it "supplements the 2001 Guidance by providing additional
guidance and practical examples regarding the Title IX requirements as they relate to sexual vio-
lence." Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 3, at 2. If the DCL were vacated for being procedurally
invalid, that would leave the 2001 Guidance Document in place.
200. Mary P. Koss et al., Campus Sexual Misconduct: Restorative Justice Approaches to En-
hance Compliance with Title IX Guidance, 15 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 242, 246-47 (2014).
201. See Tom Tyler, Restorative Justice and Procedural Justice: Dealing with Rule Breaking,
62 J. SOC. ISSUES 307, 315 (2006).
202. Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century,
23 CRIME & JUST. 1, 7 (1998); see generally Aaron Chalfm & Justin McCrary, Criminal Deterrence:
A Review of the Literature, J. ECON. LITERATURE (forthcoming),
http://eml.berkeley.edu/-jmccrary/chalfm mccrary2015b.pdf (finding that severity of punishment is
not the greatest contributor to deterrence).
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an underreported crime that usually happens behind closed doors without
witnesses and, consequently, is the type of setting where police are un-
likely to be. As will be explained below, universities should offer restor-
ative justice processes and make sure that any adjudicatory processes
provide procedural justice.
A. Restorative Justice
Restorative justice processes (RJ) offer particular promise. As Tom
Tyler explains: "Restorative Justice argues that the social goal that
should dominate reactions to transgressions is to resolve the dispute via
reintegrative shaming [which] ... combines strong disapproval of bad
conduct with respect for the person who committed those bad acts. The
goal is restoring victims, offenders and the community., 203 Unlike medi-
ation, which treats parties as neutral, the starting point for RJ is that
"harm has been done and someone is responsible for repairing it."
20 4
This distinction is important because the 1997 Guidance Document 25
and the 2001 Guidance Document 206 told schools that they could not use
mediation in cases of sexual assault, even if voluntary. Importantly,
however, both the 1997 Guidance 20 7 and the 2001 Guidance 208 specifical-
ly stated that schools could use informal mechanisms in resolving sexual
harassment complaints if both parties agreed. Since RJ is fundamentally
different than mediation in terms of the way that it situates the parties, it
would seem to be permissible under both the 1997 and 2001 Guidance
Documents.
RJ provides a marked contrast to the way that OCR has told schools
to handle sexual assault. The OCR approach could be characterized as
"progressive exclusion" meaning that as the seriousness of the offense
increases, the offender is further separated from the institution.20 9 This
203. See Tyler, supra note 201, at 315.
204. See Koss et al., supra note 200, at 246. Koss argues that this distinction is important: Judi-
cial "responses to sexual misconduct must acknowledge and obviate the negative effects of societal
and individual norms that operate to silence victims and create opportunities for reabuse. When
someone has been harmed by another person, mediation that provides neutrality and treats parties as
equal partners in the resolution process is inappropriate." Id. at 245-46. Koss also argues that be-
cause of this difference, colleges can adopt RJ and not be in violation of the DCL. Id. at 246.
205. OCR 1997, supra note 54.
206. OCR 2001, supra note 68, at 21.
207. OCR 1997, supra note 54.
208. OCR 2001, supra note 68, at 21.
209. David R. Karp & Olivia Frank, Restorative Justice & Student Development in Higher Edu-
cation: Expanding "'Offender" Horizons Beyond Punishment and Rehabilitation to Community En-
2016]
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
approach may increase community safety and convey community disap-
probation, but it "directly conflicts with the aspirations of rehabilitation
and reintegration, which aim to restore the student's personal well-being
and relationship to their school community., 210 In addition, unlike RJ,
traditional disciplinary proceedings are only able to address the assault
on a micro level (between the parties involved) instead of looking be-
yond to the forces that helped to create the situation in the first place.
Although RJ is geared towards reintegrating the transgressing stu-
dent back into the community, it is also dedicated to helping the victim
heal and move forward. "A consensus of published studies is that sexual
assault victims need to tell their own stories about their own experiences,
obtain answers to questions, experience validation as a legitimate victim,
observe offender remorse for harming them, (and) receive support that
counteracts isolations and self-blame., 21' RJ responds to these needs. In
conferencing (the most widely used model of RJ), the first meeting be-
gins with the responsible person (otherwise known as the respondent or
the accused) describing and taking responsibility for what he did and the
victim describing the impact of the violation.212 Family and friends of
both are present for support and are given the opportunity to explain the
impact of the harm. 213 A written redress plan is later formalized that de-
scribes "the concrete means through which the responsible person will be
held accountable and remedy the impacts on victims and the communi-
ty.'214 This can include counseling (sex offender treatment, drug and al-
cohol interventions, and anger management), community service, and
victim restitution.21 " A one-year supervision period is put in place to
monitor the responsible person and make sure that he meets his commit-
ments.216
RJ has been shown to be effective at lowering recidivism and em-
powering victims in both academic and non-academic settings. A 2014
study by David Karp and Casey Sacks compared outcomes across three
different college disciplinary processes: model code (a term used for the
more traditional hearing conducted by a single hearing officer or pan-
gagement and Personal Growth, in OFFENDERS No MORE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE DIALOGUE 143 (Theo Gavrielides, ed., 2016)
210. Id.
211. Koss et al., supra note 200, at 246-47.
212. Id. at 248.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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el), 2 17 restorative justice, and a combination of the two. 218 Karp and Ca-
sey used data from the STARR project, which has a total of 659 com-
219plete cases, gathered from 18 colleges and universities across the
U.S. 220 Although they cautioned that their results may be limited by the
fact that they had few suspension-level cases, their findings showed that
RJ provided a positive alternative to more traditional disciplinary pro-
ceedings. They "consistently found that restorative justice practices have
a greater impact on student learning than model code hearings.",
221
More significantly, RJ has been successfully adopted for juvenile sex
offenses and adult sex crimes. RESTORE is one such program that uses
conferencing, a widely used RJ methodology. 222  Koss evaluated RE-
STORE using a sample of 66 cases involving sex crimes. Although cau-
tion is necessary due to the small sample size, the results are promising.
Koss found that 63% of victims and 90% of responsible persons chose
RJ; 80% of responsible persons completed all elements of their redress
plan within one year (12 months), and post-conference surveys showed
that in excess of 90% of all participants, including the victims, agreed
that they felt supported, listened to, treated fairly and with respect, "and
believed that the conference was a success. 223 Importantly, there were
no incidents involving physical threats, and standardized assessments
showed decreases in victim posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms from
intake to post conference.224
But perhaps the most persuasive case for RJ can be made from lis-
tening to victims who have participated in the process. In 2014, the den-
tal school at Dalhousie University in Canada was rocked by a scandal in
which male students were posting sexist remarks about female students
on a private FACEBOOK page.225 The female students elected to go
217. David R. Karp & Casey Sacks, Student Conduct, Restorative Justice, and Student Devel-
opment: Findings from the STARR Project. A Student Accountability and Restorative Research Pro-
ject, 17 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 154, 156 (2014). "The model code calls for a hearing process that is
conducted by a single hearing officer or a volunteer board, often composed of students, faculty, and
staff. While proponents of the model code highlight that the hearing is not a criminal trial, it has
many of the similarities to the courtroom process." Id.
218. See id.
219. Id. at 162.
220. Id. at 160.
221. Id. at 169.
222. See Koss et al., supra note 200, at 248.
223. Id. (internal citation omitted).
224. Id.
225. Jennifer J. Llewellyn et al., REPORT FROM THE RESTORATIVE JUSTICE PROCESS AT THE
DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF DENTISTRY 2 (2015),
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through a restorative justice process despite considerable external pres-
sure to do otherwise. At the end, the women released a written statement
in which they explained why it was so important for them to have control
over the process and how much they had gained from restorative justice:
We made this choice informed of all of the options available to us and
came to our decision independently and without coercion.... Many peo-
ple (some with good intentions) have spoken about us and in the process
often attempted to speak for us in ways that we have experienced as harm-
ful silencing and retraumatizing. Our perspective and decision to proceed
through this process has often not been honoured or trusted but dismissed
or criticized based on the decisions or perspectives of others. We are
strong, well-educated professional women with words of our own to ex-
plain what we are going through and how we want to proceed.... The re-
storative process has provided a very important space for us to engage
safely and respectfully with our colleagues and others to convey our per-
spectives and needs. The process allows us to be involved in a manner
that both respects and values our unique perspectives and the level of
commitment and connection we desire. Additionally, it allows us to ad-
dress underlying systemic and institutional issues influencing the climate
and culture in which we live and learn. We want this process to make a
significant contribution to bringing about a change in that culture and hope
that we will be given the respect, time and space needed to do this
work.
2 26
Prominent scholars like Mary Koss 227 and Donna Coker228 have
called for universities to include RJ in addressing allegations of sexual
assault. Koss has outlined how RJ can be used not solely as an alterna-
tive resolution process but also as a complement to a formal adjudicatory
hearing. 29 For instance, it could be used as a sanctioning process (to de-
termine the appropriate sanction after a finding of responsibility has been
made) and as a reintegration process once the responsible student has fin-
ished his sanction. However RJ is used, Coker emphasizes that the re-
sponsible person's statements during RJ proceedings must be protected
so that they cannot be used by the state in a future prosecution, otherwise
RJ will just become a discovery gathering opportunity for the state. 3
http://www.dal.ca/content/dam/ dalhousie/pdf/cultureofrespect/RJ2015-Report.pdf.
226. Id. at app. A, at 67-68.
227. See Koss et al., supra note 200.
228. See Donna Coker, Restorative Justice Responses to Sexual Assault on Campus (2016) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with author).
229. See Koss et al., supra note 200, at 250, 252-53.
230. See Coker, supra note 228, at 25-26.
SEXUAL ASSAULT ADJUDICATION
B. Procedural Justice
If both parties cannot agree to an alternative process then schools
must turn to formal adjudication. Under pressure from the DOE, univer-
sities have lowered procedural protections afforded to those students ac-
cused of sexual assault.231' They have also been encouraged by the White
House to move (and many have) to an investigatory process in which
there is no formal hearing, and it is often a single individual who investi-
gates and determines whether a violation occurred. 232 This pivot away
from process is a grave mistake and should be corrected immediately.
Because being found responsible for sexual assault can be devastat-
ing for the accused student, robust procedural protections are warranted.
Although a university cannot sentence a student to custody, it can sus-
pend or expel that student. While some commentators downplay the se-
riousness of such a punishment, individual stories show otherwise. A
young man named Joseph Roberts, for example, has described the impact
of an email he received two weeks before his scheduled graduation stat-
ing that he was being removed from campus due to a complaint of sexual
assault.233 The email stated that he would be subject to expulsion and ar-
rest if he returned. 34 There was never a hearing in the case, and Roberts
never received his diploma.2 35 Roberts was so distraught that he attempt-
ed suicide.236
Apart from reputational stigma that results from being found respon-
sible for a sex offense,23 being expelled can seriously diminish a per-
son's future career prospects and overall happiness. Studies have shown
that earning a college degree has been positively linked to a multitude of
benefits, including better health, longer life, a more fulfilling workplace,
231. See Tamara Rice Lave, Ready, Fire, Aim: How Universities Are Failing the Constitution in
Sexual Assault Cases, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2016); Tamara Rice Lave, A Critical Look at
how Private Universities Adjudicate Rape, U. MIAMI L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
232. White House Task Force to Protect Students from Sexual Assault, Not Alone: The First
Report of the White House Task Force to Protect Students from Sexual Assault, NOTALONE.GOV
(April 2014), https://www.notalone.gov/assets/report.pdf, see Ready, Fire, Aim, supra note 231.
233. See Cathy Young, A Real Dialoguefor a Change, WEEKLY STANDARD (Jan. 25, 2016),
http://www.weeklystandard.com/a-real-dialogue-for-a-change/article/2000597. This author was the
co-organizer of this panel and was present for Joseph Roberts's remarks.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Ariel Kaminer, Accusers and the Accused, Crossing Paths at Columbia University, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/22/nyregion/accusers-and-the-accused-
crossing-paths-at-columbia.html? r-0.
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and higher lifetime earnings. 238 Graduating from college is particularly
important for those coming from disadvantaged backgrounds. A 2011
study found that, "the chances of achieving economic success are inde-
pendent of social background among those who attain a BA."
239
It is not just the accused that benefits from a fair adjudicatory pro-
cess-so does the community as a whole. Although many believe that it
is the threat or use of punishment that shapes compliance with the law,240
social psychologists like Tom Tyler contend that legitimacy is a more
powerful force. "Legitimacy is a feeling of obligation to obey the law
and to defer to the decisions made by legal authorities. 24' In his 1990
book Why People Obey the Law, Tyler argued that the basis of legitima-
cy is procedural justice.242 Subsequent research laid out the six compo-
nents of procedural justice: representation (the belief to which parties be-
lieve they had the opportunity to take part in the decision-making
process); consistency (similarity of treatment over time and as compared
with like parties); impartiality (when the legal authority is unbiased); ac-
curacy (ability to make competent, high quality decisions which includes
the public airing of the problem); correctability (whether the legal system
has a mechanism for correcting mistakes); and ethicality (when the au-
thorities treat parties with dignity and respect.)243  Importantly, Tyler
found that it was perceived fairness and not case outcome that influenced
people's evaluation of their courtroom experience.244
238. SANDY BAUM, JENNIFER MA& KATHLEEN PAYEA, EDUCATION PAYS 2013: THE BENEFITS
OF HIGHER EDUCATION FOR INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY, COLL. BD. 5-8 (2013),
https://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/education-pays-2013-full-report.pdf, HOWARD R.
BOWEN, INVESTMENT IN LEARNING: THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL VALUE OF AMERICAN HIGHER
EDUCATION 219-35 (1977); see generally LARRY L. LESLIE & PAUL T. BRNKMAN, THE ECONOMIC
VALUE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (1988).
239. Florencia Torche, Is a College Degree Still the Great Equalizer? Intergenerational Mobili-
ty Across Levels of Schooling in the United States, 117 A. J. OF SOC. 763, 798 (2011) ("The finding
is largely consistent across all indicators of socioeconomic standing: social class, occupational sta-
tus, individual earnings, and total family income.").
240. See Nagin, supra note 202, at 3 (Nagin noted, while reviewing studies on the impact of
deterrence: "I now concur with Cook's more emphatic conclusion that the collective actions of the
criminal justice system exert a very substantial deterrent effect.").
241. Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Po-
lice Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 235 (2008).
242. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3-4 (2006); see also TOM R. TYLER & YUEN
J. HUo, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS
7-18 (2002); Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 375, 384 (2006).
243. See Raymond Paternoster et al., Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of Procedural Jus-
tice on Spouse Assault, 31 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 163, 167-69 (1997).
244. Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice on Defendants'Evaluations of Their Court-
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The importance of procedural justice explains why universities must
not ignore the outcry among many students and faculty that campus pro-
ceedings are unfair. Tyler explains:
Research makes clear that people feel that authorities are entitled to be
obeyed when they exercise authority using fair procedures. Further, the
use of fair procedures leads people to feel that the authorities share their
moral values. In both cases, the key psychological mechanism is the acti-
vation of internal social values, which then motivate self-regulatory be-
havior.
2 45
In other words, if students believe they are being treated fairly, they
will be more likely to follow campus codes of conduct. As noted above,
courts are starting to rule that universities have deprived students of basic
procedural protections.24 6 Schools would be wise to fix these proceed-
ings on their own rather than waiting for courts to force them to change.
Acting on their own demonstrates that schools believe in procedural fair-
ness; being forced to act conveys the opposite.
1. Recommended Protections
The 2001 Guidance Document acknowledged, as it must, that, "[t]he
rights established under Title IX must be interpreted consistent with any
federally protected due process rights involved in a complaint proceed-
ing.",247 What those protections should look like to satisfy due process
has been more fully developed elsewhere, 248 but a brief summary is in
order. To begin with, students facing suspension or expulsion should
have the right to a full adjudicatory hearing in which witnesses testify
and evidence is presented. The investigatory model that some schools
are using is gravely flawed. As the court explained in Doe v. Brandeis
room Experience, 18 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 51, 51 (1984).
245. Tyler, supra note 201, at 315.
246. See infra Part 1I1.B.1.
247. OCR 2001, supra note 68, at 22.
248. See Ready, Fire, Aim, supra note 231 (discussing the procedural protections public univer-
sities should afford in order to meet their obligations under the constitution and to promote feelings
of legitimacy among their student body); see also A Critical Look, supra note 231 (arguing that by
using the threat of removing federal funding to force universities to lower their procedural protec-
tions, OCR has essentially turned private action into state action, and private universities, therefore,
must also comply with procedural due process).
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University: "The dangers of combining in a single individual the power
to investigate, prosecute, and convict, with little effective power of re-
view, are obvious. No matter how well-intentioned, such a person may
have preconceptions and biases, may make mistakes, and may reach
premature conclusions.,
249
At that hearing, the accused student should have the right to a trained
advocate provided by the school (not necessarily a lawyer). Although
such an advocate is unlikely to be constitutionally required, it makes
sense from a procedural justice standpoint since an advocate will provide
important assistance during a high-stakes proceeding and enhance the
hearing's accuracy. Students also should have the right to directly ques-
tion their accuser, which as the court in Doe v. Brandeis University ex-
plained, is particularly important in credibility contests where there are
no witnesses or other extrinsic evidence .2 To allow the pursuit of truth
while avoiding unnecessary trauma to the complainant, schools should
have the advocate undertake the direct questioning rather than the re-
spondent himself.
Students must also have sufficient advance notice of what they are
alleged to have done so that they can prepare their defense. In Goss v.
Lopez, the U.S. Supreme Court held that public high school students fac-
ing suspension had a property interest in their education and a liberty in-
terest in their good name.2 5 ' At a minimum, the Court held that "the stu-
dent [must] be given oral or written notice of the charges against him
and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities
have and an opportunity to present his side of the story.",212 Lopez care-
fully distinguished between the initial notice requirement and what a
school has to provide once a student has denied the charges. The initial
notice requirement is not that rigorous and requires only that a student
"first be told what he is accused of doing and what the basis of the accu-
sation is." '253 If the student denies the charges, however, the university
has a higher burden and must provide "an explanation of the evidence the
249. Doe v. Brandeis Univ., No. 15-11557-FDS, 2016 WL 1274533, at *36 (D. Mass. Mar. 31,
2016).
250. Id. at *12.
251. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975).
252. Id. at 581.
253. Id. at 581-82. The Second Circuit has explained that "[n]otice must be 'reasonably calcu-
lated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and af-
ford them an opportunity to present their objections."' Rosa R. v. Connelly, 889 F.2d 435, 439 (2d
Cir. 1989) (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)).
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authorities have against him., 254
This distinction is important because a university might argue that it
is complying with its due process obligations by providing the accused
with a synopsis of the accusations through its Title IX coordinator. This
notice, however, only meets its notice obligation, not its more weighty
obligations under the "explanation of evidence" portion of Lopez. In-
deed, part of the reason that the Massachusetts District Court held that
John Doe's procedural rights were violated was that, "[h]e was required
to defend himself in what was essentially an inquisitorial proceeding that
plausibly failed to provide him with a fair and reasonable opportunity to
be informed of the charges and to present an adequate defense.,
255
2. Raising the Burden of Proof
Whether or not constitutionally required, schools should consider
setting the standard of proof at clear and convincing evidence.2 56 OCR
tried to mandate a preponderance of the evidence standard through the
DCL, but preponderance is simply too low for what is at stake for the ac-
cused student. In Addington v. Texas, the Court said that the function of
the standard of proof is to "instruct the factfinder concerning the degree
of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of fac-
tual conclusions for a particular adjudication., 257 Setting a high or low
standard is a way of "allocate[ing] the risk of error between the litigants
and indicat[ing] the relative importance attached to the ultimate deci-
sion. , 25
8
Although a student will not go to jail if the student is found to have
violated the school of conduct, the student's life will almost certainly still
be gravely affected. The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(FERPA) generally prohibits the improper disclosure of personally iden-
tifiable information obtained from education records, but there are excep-
tions for crimes of violence. 9 Universities are required to notify the
victim of the outcome of the proceedings,260 and they are allowed to dis-
254. Goss, 419 U.S. at 581.
255. Brandeis Univ., 2016 WL 1274533, at *37.
256. See Ready, Fire, Aim, supra note 231; see also A Critical Look, supra note 231.
257. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370
(1970)).
258. Id. at 423.
259. 34C.F.R. §99.31, App. A(2012).
260. 34 C.F.R. § 99.3 1(a)(13) (2012).
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close to third parties when they find that a student has committed rape or
sexual assault.2 6 ' A number of universities mark official transcripts to
indicate that the person committed non-academic misconduct.2 62 Alt-
hough some students have the savvy and resources to transfer to another
school after being expelled, many do not. Without an undergraduate de-
gree, a person's earning potential and career opportunities are signifi-
cantly curtailed.
The DCL states that the preponderance of the evidence standard is
justified on the ground that the Supreme Court uses a preponderance
standard in civil litigation under Title VII, and that the OCR uses the
preponderance standard when it resolves complaints against recipients of
federal funds. 263 This may be true, but it does not explain why the stand-
ard should be preponderance in campus disciplinary hearings. After all,
only an institution or an institutional actor can violate Title IX, as is ob-
vious from the language of the statute: "No person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance., 264 As the Court
explained in Gebser: "Title IX focuses more on 'protecting' individuals
from discriminatory practices carried out by recipients of federal
funds."265
The question then is whether allowing universities to set the standard
of proof at a standard higher than preponderance either (1) supports dis-
criminatory practices or (2) denies individuals effective protection
against such practices. Setting the burden of proof so high that a finding
of culpability is almost impossible would certainly constitute a discrimi-
natory practice, but it seems unlikely that clear and convincing evidence
would have that effect. Indeed, the standard of proof at a criminal trial is
beyond a reasonable doubt, and defendants are still convicted of rape,
even in cases where the only evidence that the sex was non-consensual is
the victim's testimony.266
261. 34 C.F.R. § 99.3 1(a)(14) (2012).
262. Collin Binkley et al., Students Transfer Easily after Violent Offenses, THE COLUMBUS Dis-
PATCH (Nov. 24, 2014, 8:05 AM),
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2014/11/24/hidden-on-campus.html.
263. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 3, at 11-12.
264. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
265. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 287 (1998) (citing Cannon v. Univ.
of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 702 (1979))
266. See Bill Redeker, Rapist Convicted on Victim's Testimony, ABC NEWS (Aug. 28, 2004),
http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id-129479; Vanessa Junkin, Teen Convicted of Rape in High
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Furthermore, requiring that the standard of proof be set at preponder-
ance means that some schools have a lower standard of proof for allega-
267tions of sexual harassment or assault than for other offenses . As the
Massachusetts District Court observed in Doe v. Brandeis University, in-
tentionally making it easier to find men responsible for sexual assault
compared to other misconduct is particularly problematic in light of the
elimination of other basic procedural rights of the accused:
The standard of proof in sexual misconduct cases at Brandeis is proof by a
"preponderance of the evidence." For virtually all other forms of alleged
misconduct at Brandeis, the more demanding standard of proof by "clear
and convincing evidence" is employed. The selection of a lower standard
(presumably, at the insistence of the United States Department of Educa-
tion) is not problematic, standing alone; that standard is commonly used in
civil proceedings, even to decide matters of great importance. Here, how-
ever, the lowering of the standard appears to have been a deliberate choice
by the university to make cases of sexual misconduct easier to prove-and
thus more difficult to defend, both for guilty and innocent students alike.
It retained the higher standard for virtually all other forms of student mis-
conduct. The lower standard may thus be seen, in context, as part of an ef-
fort to tilt the playing field against accused students, which is particularly
troublesome in light of the elimination of other basic rights of the ac-
cused. 268
3. Mandating Preponderance of the Evidence while Ignoring other Title
VII Protections
From a procedural justice standpoint, OCR's justification for setting
the standard of proof at preponderance of the evidence is particularly
problematic. OCR argues that the standard of proof should be prepon-
derance because that is what the government uses in Title VII hearings.
If OCR wants to base its procedural protections on Title VII, however,
then it should require all of the same rights afforded at Title VII hear-
ings. Under Title VII, the EEOC is barred from releasing the names of
those under investigation, 269 and if someone does release a name, they
will be fined, jailed, or both .2  If the DCL wants to pattern its proceed-
School Hallway, USA TODAY (Oct. 22, 2014, 7:49 AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/10/21/teen-convicted-of-rape-in-high-school-
hallway/17699211/.
267. See Ready, Fire, Aim, supra note 231; see also A Critical Look, supra note 231.
268. Doe v. Brandeis Univ., No. 15-11557-FDS, 2016 WL 1274533, at *37 (D. Mass. Mar. 31,
2016).
269. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2012) ("Charges shall not be made public by the Commission.").
270. Id.
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ings on those under Title VII, then it should also penalize releasing the
names of schools under investigation.
In addition, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 gives both parties in a Title
VII case the right to a jury trial if one party requests compensatory or
punitive damages.2 ' Having the right to trial under Title VII means that
employers enjoy a panoply of other protections including: the right to
counsel; the right to a jury2 2 comprised of jurors who have not been ex-
cluded on account of race or gender;273 the right to strike jurors for
cause; 274 the right to three peremptory challenges; 275 the right to confront
and cross-examine witnesses (including the complainant); the right to
depose witnesses; and the right to the rules of evidence (thus barring
hearsay evidence unless it is subject to a recognized exception). Finally,
an employer cannot be found responsible for violating Title VII unless
276the jurors are unanimous .
Not only does the DOE not mandate or even recommend that these
rights provided by Title VII be provided, the DCL affirmatively recom-
mends against some of them. For instance, OCR strongly discourages
schools from allowing the parties to directly question one another,2  and
it tells schools that they "should not allow the alleged perpetrator to re-
view the complainant's statement without also allowing the complainant
to review the alleged perpetrator's statement.' 278 Cherry picking the
provisions of Title VII that lower a student's procedural rights while ig-
noring the provisions that strengthen them undermines the legitimacy of
a school's disciplinary proceedings because accused students will under-
standably feel like they are not being treated fairly.
IV. CONCLUSION
The DCL is a legislative rule, and because it did not go through no-
271. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071-1100 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
272. FED. R. Civ. P. 48.
273. In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), the Court held that the prohi-
bition against discriminatory peremptory challenges applies in civil cases. This includes race (Bat-
son v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87-98 (1986)), ethnicity (Hernandez v. New York, 400 U.S. 352
(1991)), and gender (J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994)).
274. 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (2012).
275. Id.
276. FED. R. Civ. P. 48.
277. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 3, at 11-12.
278. Id.
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tice-and-comment, it is procedurally invalid. Courts should vacate it,
which would leave the 2001 or 1997 Guidance Documents in effect.
Both of these Guidance Documents give schools considerable flexibility
in determining how they want to adjudicate campus rape. In deciding
how to proceed, universities should provide various levels of formality in
their proceedings and focus on giving complainants a say in the process
that will be pursued. They also should institute processes that encourage
internal law abidingness. Universities can achieve this and be in compli-
ance with Title IX if they provide restorative justice processes. They
should also increase the procedural protections afforded in disciplinary
hearings so that students are more likely to believe that they are being
treated fairly. The effect will be greater law abidingness, which trans-
lates into fewer victims.
Unfortunately, such a change is unlikely to happen any time soon.
Even if a judge would strike down the DCL, she will not have the chance
to do so unless it is actually challenged in court. Colleges and universi-
ties are unlikely to do this because of the considerable pressure they face.
Supporters of the DCL approach have organized into a public and potent
force against universities, 27 9 as exemplified by the backlash against the
Harvard Law professors who wrote a 2014 op-ed in the Boston Globe
criticizing Harvard's post DCL sexual harassment policy as "overwhelm-
ingly stacked against the accused., 280 Harvard students responded quick-
ly, saying "[b]y implying Harvard should disregard its legal obligation to
protect all of its students and ensure a safe and anti-discriminatory envi-
ronment, this piece displays a callous lack of understanding of sexual vi-
,,281
olence and its effect on survivors in educational institutions. In addi-
tion, two recent articles have discussed how universities under suspicion
for violating Title IX are receiving fewer applications from prospective
students and fewer donations from alumni,282 which means that schools
279. Emanuella Grinberg, Ending Rape on Campus: Activism Takes Several Forms, CNN (Feb.
12, 2014, 11:35 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/09/living/campus-sexual-violence-students-
schools/.
280. Opinion: Rethink Harvard's Sexual Harassment Policy, BOSTON GLOBE (Oct. 15, 2014),
http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/10/14/rethink-harvard-sexual-harassment-
policy/HFDDiZN7nU2UwuUuWMnqbM story.html.
281. Tyler Kingkade, Harvard Students Slam Law Professors' Claim of Policy Bias Against
Accused Rapists, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 15, 2014, 9:00 PM),
http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/2014/10/15/harvard-law-professors-sexual-assault-
policy n 5993510.html.
282. See Gayle Nelson, The High Cost of Sexual Assaults on College Campuses, NON PROFIT
QUARTERLY (June 23, 2015), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2015/06/23/the-high-cost-of-sexual-
assaults-on-college-campuses/; see also Tyler Kingkade, Alumni Are Creating a Network to Put
2016]
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
are likely to simply do what OCR demands instead of waging a reputa-
tion damaging court battle.
In the meantime, the Department of Education can continue to pre-
tend that the DCL is just a guidance document while using public sham-
ing to enforce it. As long as OCR continues to publish the names of
schools under investigation, they will be under enormous pressure to do
what OCR demands, even though it only takes one complaint and no fac-
tual finding to make the list.283 Thus a school that may want to provide
additional procedural protections and institute restorative justice process-
es-measures that would be fully compliant with Title IX-are unwilling
to do so because they deem the cost as simply too high.
Instead, change will have to be achieved piecemeal by individual
students fighting their cases in court as has happened in Boston and San
Diego. Although a risk-averse school may think it is better to have a
judge force them to change their policy, such an approach will only un-
dermine students' faith in the fairness of the school's disciplinary sys-
tem. Schools would be better served to demonstrate their respect for vic-
tim decision-making power by instituting restorative justice processes
and to encourage and increase general law abidingness by fostering pro-
cedural justice.
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